Claude Context Guard report verification

Type: agentic-system-analyses/types/agentic-system-verification.md

Verification

The frozen checkout HEAD equals the reviewed revision and its working tree is clean. I independently read every tracked text file in SRC-1: install.sh, README.md, .gitignore, .claude/settings.json, both hook scripts, all six command prompts and all eight templates named in the boundary coverage table. Images remain excluded. These reads support the shipped-package boundary, not host execution or consumer outcomes. No target code, tests, examples or installations were executed.

I checked every declaration, annotation and epistemic ledger entry against its source anchors, conditions, ordering, evidence strength and consequential wording. Structural report-check reports none; there is no structural failure to route. Runtime supplies one correction answer; the other three answer files are empty. Analyst validation results were not treated as claim verification.

Correction disposition. The earlier threshold blocker is repaired in RT-RTE-itemise-code. SRC-1, .claude/commands/itemise.md, says “over 500” for mandatory delegation, “under 500” for direct editing and “500+ lines” in the heading. Runtime now retains all three passages, leaves exactly 500 ambiguous and preserves foreground verification and the supported large-file branch. I checked the runtime account and dependent workflow/reconciliation wording; none now asserts a definite inclusive threshold. The reconciliation threshold disposition correctly recognizes convergence without choosing a source-policy branch. Its later sentence saying no correction answers were supplied is not an accurate description of this verifier's inputs, but does not contradict its actual threshold disposition or alter a source finding. I dismiss that bookkeeping wording as nonmaterial to this bounded account; this verification records the supplied answer and its independently checked repair.

Runtime and enforcement. The two components, two installed objects, eight routes, protection claim and project-rule authority path in runtime Shared records match the inspected source responsibilities. The installer copies six prompts, two hooks and templates, skips existing settings and optionally copies commands/hooks to a parent. Startup, checkpoint/end, lessons, itemisation and audit are model-operated procedures. Root discovery, first-run creation, orphan attribution and user continuation follow the startup prompt. Save/end have different terminal handoff states and no cross-file transaction. The commit hook matches raw input and exits zero without ledger checking. The backup hook attempts five existing-file copies, increments its count without checking success and exits zero. RT-RTE-commit-reminder, RT-RTE-compact-backup and RT-CLM-progress-protection correctly withhold blocking, complete progress capture and achieved recovery. The requested authority in RT-BAP-project-rules is not promoted to enforced compliance. Host model version, parameter change and endpoint replacement remain uninspected rather than absent.

Memory objects and consumers. I traced all twelve memory objects: current handoff, session history, tasks, comments, decisions, learned behaviours, feature QA, plans, audits, markers, sidecar descriptions and helpers. Formats, lineage, admission, withdrawal and specified consumers match SRC-1's command/template pairs. /save retains an unclean handoff and historical entry; /end clears that handoff and retains intent in history. Rotation changes access through indexes without revoking constraints; old tasks receive explicit dispositions. Human QA admission differs from ordinary logging and lesson proposal approval. Marker addresses and sidecar meanings have different checks and consumers. Helper export establishes a documented future caller role, not deployed invocation. Backup persistence has no shipped restoration consumer. The seven memory annotations preserve those distinctions, including custom-file trust, retained reasons, selector inputs, working-context opacity and update-versus-downstream consumers. None infers activation or learning from storage alone.

Epistemic edges and checks. All ten epistemic object declarations identify the stated artifacts. The four route parts and five claims in epistemic Shared records have supported referents and bounded statuses. The authority ledger separates checking from disposition and retention from accepted-claim integration. Prompt-directed procedures are doctrine only; the hooks are implemented with operation unobserved. Human end-to-end verification supplies a bounded QA criterion, not universal correctness. Lesson approval permits installation without a general factual acceptance criterion; helper self-tests follow approval/install. Without actual script, summary and source-description pairs, indeterminate semantic transformation findings are appropriate. Script differences need not demonstrate falsification, two-way helper tests do not prove universal safety, archival does not establish truth, and a five-session window does not impose a fixed token budget.

I independently traced EPI-RTE-itemise-filter's multiline-string deduction through SRC-1, .claude/commands/itemise.md's regex, CR deletion and diff -B expression. Changing the numbered line inside a Python multiline string changes executable string data while both normalized streams omit it. This is a source-level counterexample, not observed corruption. It supports withholding universal preservation warrant. Theory-builder conditions, learning, reflection, autonomy and self-improvement remain separately qualified in the lesson container and inference part; no causal link or achieved improvement is inferred from installation, approval or future delivery alone.

Relations and reconciliation. All four Part of: relations are semantically valid: feature check and admission belong to checkpoint/end persistence; lesson inference belongs to harvesting; filtered comparison belongs to itemisation. Each owns a distinct function without invalidating its container. The ten supersession amendments identify the same consumer objects across memory and epistemic declarations. They retain both declarations and lens-specific findings, not stronger replacement statuses. Sidecar identity does not absorb the distinct marker object. Components, producer routes, output objects and claim assertions otherwise remain distinct. The reconciliation dispositions preserve every memory integration issue. No unresolved cross-report disagreement remains: the source-policy conflicts are uncertainties shared by the reports, not competing analyst precedence choices. There is no evidenced-absence declaration needing a broader absence warrant and no identified required undeclared material part.

Workflow. SRC-1, .claude/commands/itemise.md, supports the workflow account and its route annotation: human-confirmed scope, backups, full-file foreground planning, specific worker insertion packet, foreground granularity/parity/integrity checks, retry responsibility, per-file source restoration and local filesystem/report delivery. Worker completion is not acceptance. Successful peers remain edited; source restoration does not explicitly restore sidecars. The host Agent grant, isolation, exactly-500 routing and retry accounting remain unresolved. None of those uncertainties is presented as an achieved reliability guarantee.

Consequential omission search. The frozen tracked tree and installer/settings dispatch selected three questions beyond listed anchors: whether an alternate shipped route supplies stronger checkpoint or restoration guarantees; whether ordinary maintenance and later consumers change retention/loading conclusions; and whether lesson/itemisation evaluators license broader reliance than recorded. I inspected manual copying and parent deployment, both event consumers, complete project instructions and every command/template producer-consumer pair. There is no omitted shipped executable restore, factual acceptance or model-update mechanism in those inspected paths. The alternate paths instead confirm the already-retained settings/root mismatch, variable startup loading, plan/no-Git/rotation/comment-policy tensions, sensitive-content tension, resume-warning inconsistency and sidecar correspondence/rollback uncertainty. These are already scoped beside the affected findings, not converted into complete-coverage or achieved-benefit claims.

Optional omission expansion stops because each selected question has a supported disposition and no identified material challenge remains without disposition. Generated consumer histories, future helper calls and host/provider internals cannot be established from this frozen package; the reports already withhold their behavior and benefit conclusions. The supported account remains model-operated retention, selective reload and human-gated admission with narrow executable hooks, not demonstrated loss-free recovery, learning or self-improvement. No additional publication limit is required beyond the reports' faithfully scoped uncertainty.

Blockers

none

Limits

none