Outcome: likely material residuals found

• Run-id: synthetic-import-01
• Method-commit: synthetic-no-git-commit
• Source-revision: synthetic-no-git-revision
• Case: constructed source-and-trace fixture, not an observed system.

One material defect survives in both accepted artifacts: a native-only approval requirement is presented as applying to every import path. The trace supports incomplete evidence recovery after a failed source read and a subsequent correction that addressed only a validation marker. It does not establish that the failed read itself prevented inspection of the batch implementation.

All paths below are relative to the supplied fixture directory.

Residual findings

1. Universal approval guarantee survives despite an unguarded batch path

Disposition: likely-material-residual

Accepted passages

• accepted/synthesis.md:3: “All import paths require explicit user approval before retained data is written. The native handler raises PermissionError when approval is absent.”
• accepted/memory-profile.md:3: “Admission: explicit user approval is required for every import path.”

The native-handler statement is supported. The universal statements are contradicted by the frozen source:

• source/native_import.py:1–4 accepts an approved argument and raises PermissionError when it is false.
• source/batch_import.py:1–3 accepts only rows, explicitly describes bypassing interactive approval, and calls persist(rows) without an approval check.
• source/README.md:3 distinguishes the native and batch paths.

This changes the reader’s understanding of admission control: the accepted comparison value describes a universal safeguard where the supplied implementation has a separate trusted-batch bypass.

Failed acquisition and intended evidence

The worker attempted to read source/import_policy.py; execution c1 failed with ENOENT (worker.jsonl:4–5). No source evidence was returned. The filename suggests a policy-level inquiry, but the trace does not explicitly state the worker’s purpose, so the intended contents cannot be reconstructed.

The exact assignment required inspecting both native and batch import paths before making any universal approval claim (method/worker.md:3; also captured by c0, worker.jsonl:2–3). That requirement identifies the evidence needed to support the eventual claim.

Recovery checked

The subsequent reads acquired:

• Native implementation: c2, worker.jsonl:6–7.
• README explicitly identifying a separate batch path: c3, worker.jsonl:8–9.

There is no batch-source read or equivalent acquisition in the complete supplied trace. The worker then wrote the universal claim (c4, worker.jsonl:10–11).

Validation initially failed because the draft retained Validation: pending (c5, lines 12–13). The sole recorded correction changed that marker to Validation: passed (c6, lines 14–15), without changing the substantive claim. The next validation succeeded but expressly stated: “Member content check passes. This is not claim support” (c7, lines 16–17). Both accepted artifacts retain the universal claim.

Causal connection and limits

The supported process connection is incomplete recovery of the evidence needed for a universal claim: a source acquisition failed, subsequent successful reads established only the native guard and the existence of another path, and the worker published the broader guarantee without inspecting that path. The omitted branch directly contradicts the surviving guarantee.

However, c1 was a standalone read, not a command whose failure mechanically skipped a batch read. The record does not prove that the nonexistent policy-file read caused the later omission, nor what that file would have contained. The material content defect is directly established; attribution to the individual ENOENT event is narrower and less certain than attribution to the documented incomplete inspection and non-semantic correction sequence.

Smallest follow-up

No execution is needed. Compare the accepted passages with source/batch_import.py:1–3, then amend both artifacts to distinguish native approval enforcement from the trusted-batch bypass. The supported native-handler statement can remain.

Incident dispositions

Incident	Disposition	Decisive evidence
Scanner c1: failed read of source/import_policy.py	likely-material-residual — incomplete-recovery chain, with the attribution limit above	worker.jsonl:4–9 shows failure followed by native and README reads only; lines 10–11 introduce the universal claim. The omitted batch implementation contradicts that claim, which remains in both accepted artifacts. No chained operation was skipped by the failure itself.
Scanner c5: validator exits 1 over Validation: pending	recovered for the reported marker defect; process-only as evidence of substantive checking	worker.jsonl:12–17: the marker was replaced and validation subsequently passed. This is a genuine recovery of the reported formatting/content-marker issue, not evidence that approval semantics were checked. The successful result explicitly disclaims claim support.

Additional observed process omission: The batch inspection required by method/worker.md:3 is absent from the complete trace. This is not an additional failed execution and should not be counted as one. Its analytical consequence is included in the residual finding rather than counted separately.

Unresolved incidents: None requiring a separate disposition. The precise causal role of c1 remains limited as described above; there is no uncertainty about the contradiction between the accepted universal claim and the supplied batch implementation.

Coverage and limits

• Examined the sole inventoried launch, fixture-runtime-1, session synthetic-import-worker, marked delivered and accepted in attempts.json:2–8.
• Read both accepted artifacts before tracing their approval claims backward.
• Examined both scanner incidents, all 18 physical lines of worker.jsonl, and all eight completed tool executions (c0–c7). Each execution was counted once.
• Read the complete frozen worker assignment and all three supplied source files. No requested read was truncated.
• No supplied packet input was left unexamined. No target execution, validation rerun, worker launch, network access, or file mutation was performed.
• The intermediate outputs/report.md was not separately supplied; its initial contents and recorded edit are visible in the trace. Validator implementation and separate publication-stage logs were not supplied. Neither is needed to establish the surviving source contradiction, but their absence limits reconstruction of the broader workflow.
• This was a focused audit of the approval guarantee, not a correctness certificate for other properties. Successful validation and accepted delivery do not establish semantic recovery.