Epistemic stance
Type: types/note.md
Commonplace works in the Popperian tradition. Its assertions about claims, definitions, types and the meaning of instructions are true only under these commitments. This page is a stub; it grows from the connections notes make to it.
-
Fallibilism. Claims are conjectures. Observations never establish a universal statement; corroboration is a survived attempt at refutation (Popper, Logic of Scientific Discovery). Applied in the notes contract and claim modality.
-
Methodological rules are conventions (Logic of Scientific Discovery, §11). ADRs, contracts, type specs and definitions are adopted by decision and judged by their fruits. They are contested by proposing a better convention, not refuted by counterexample.
-
Anti-essentialism (Open Society, ch. 11; Poverty of Historicism, §10). The KB does not ask what a term or text really means. A definition is a stipulation read right to left: the term labels the definiens. Applied in verifiable document types and taxonomies as defaults. The meaning of an instruction is read as the reading a designated reference set of interpreters converges on, under a stated rule for when two outputs count as the same answer; see agentic systems interpret underspecified instructions.
-
Objectivity is intersubjective testability (Logic of Scientific Discovery, §8), and knowledge lives in artifacts (Popper 1968). Applied in the theory builder. This is what keeps point 3 from relativism: the reference set is chosen, but whether it converges is a fact that can fail.
-
Not inherited. The propensity interpretation of probability, verisimilitude measures, and Popper's political writings beyond their anti-essentialist argument.
Open Society and Poverty of Historicism are not ingested; cite them without quotes until they are.